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Neuroimaging (NI) technologies are having increasing impact in the study of complex
cognitive and social processes. In this emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience,
a central goal should be to increase the understanding of the interaction between the
neurobiology of the individual and the environment in which humans develop and function.
The study of sex/gender is often a focus for NI research, and may be motivated by a
desire to better understand general developmental principles, mental health problems that
show female-male disparities, and gendered differences in society. In order to ensure the
maximum possible contribution of NI research to these goals, we draw attention to four key
principles—overlap, mosaicism, contingency and entanglement—that have emerged from
sex/gender research and that should inform NI research design, analysis and interpretation.
We discuss the implications of these principles in the form of constructive guidelines and
suggestions for researchers, editors, reviewers and science communicators.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, psychologists have documented a ten-
dency for lay-people to hold “essentialist” beliefs about social cat-
egories, including gender (for summary, see Haslam and Whelan,
2008). Essentialist thinking about social categories involves two
important dimensions (Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Haslam et al.,
2000). Essentialized social categories are seen as “natural kinds”,
being natural, fixed, invariant across time and place, and dis-
crete (that is, with a sharply defined category boundary). In
addition, essentialized social categories are “reified”, being seen
as “inductively potent, homogenous, identity-determining, and
grounded in deep, inherent properties” (Haslam and Whelan,
2008, p. 1299).
Gender is a strongly essentialized category, particularly in the
degree to which it is seen as a natural kind (Haslam et al., 2000),
with interpersonal differences spontaneously interpreted through
a gendered lens (Prentice and Miller, 2006). 3G-sex (that is, the
genetic, gonadal, and genital endowment, of an individual (Joel,
2011)) is indeed highly—although not completely—internally
consistent, discrete and invariant across time and place and
thus much more of a “natural kind”. Yet decades of gender
scholarship have undermined the traditional essentialist view of
the behavioral manifestations of masculinity and femininity, and
their neural correlates, which are of interest to neuroscientists
(Schmitz and Höppner, 2014).
The key principles from gender scholarship of overlap,
mosaicism, contingency, and entanglement, reviewed in the
following sections, offer a serious challenge to essentialist notions
of sex/gender1 as fixed, invariant, and highly informative. This
is an important message for neuroscientists because, unless they
have specific expertise or knowledge in gender scholarship, they
too are laypeople with respect to gender research, and may also be
susceptible to gender essentialist thinking. Indeed, sex/gender NI2
research currently often appears to proceed as if a simple essen-
tialist view of the sexes were correct: that is, as if sexes clustered
distinctively and consistently at opposite ends of a single gender
continuum, due to distinctive female vs. male brain circuitry,
largely fixed by a sexually-differentiated genetic blueprint. Data
on the sex of participants are ubiquitously collected and available;
the two sexes may be routinely compared with only positive
findings reported (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974; Hines, 2004); and
1As we describe below, neural phenotypes represent the complex entan-
glement of biological and environmental factors, such that it is generally
not possible to entirely isolate the two. Thus, we use the composite term
“sex/gender” as a way to refer to this irreducible complexity (see also Kaiser,
2012).
2Our focus in this paper is on the use of Magnetic Resonance Imaging MRI
techniques, both structural and functional (fMRI). The majority of studies in
this area, particularly those most commonly cited in the public domain, use
MRI/fMRI techniques. We are aware that techniques with better temporal res-
olution such as electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography
(MEG) have been used in this field (and may, indeed, be more appropriate for
the cognitive processes being investigated) but detailed inclusion of these is
beyond the scope of this review. Almost all of the identified implications and
recommendations will also be relevant to EEG and MEG research.
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the emphasis on difference is institutionalized in databases that
allow only searches for sex/gender differences, not similarities
(Kaiser et al., 2009).
The all but ubiquitous group categorization on the basis of
biological sex seems to suggest the implicit assumption that a
person’s biological sex is a good proxy for gendered behavior
and that therefore categorizing a sample on the basis of sex will
yield distinct “feminine” vs. “masculine” profiles. The small sam-
ple sizes common in fMRI investigations reporting female/male
differences (Fine, 2013a) suggests the implicit assumption that
female vs. male brain functioning is so distinct that true effects
can be identified with small numbers of participants. Conversely,
with large sample sizes (seen mostly in structural comparisons),
the publication of statistically significant effects suggests the
implicit assumption that they are also of theoretical and func-
tional significance. The readiness with which researchers draw
on gender stereotypes in making reverse inferences (Bluhm,
2013b; Fine, 2013a) suggests an implicit assumption of dis-
tinctive female vs. male brains giving rise to “feminine” and
“masculine” behavior, respectively. Finally, the common use of
single “snapshot” female/male comparisons (Schmitz, 2002; Fine,
2013a) is in keeping with the implicit assumption of gen-
dered behavior and female and male brains as fixed and non-
contingent, meaning that such an approach promises to yield
“the” neural difference between the sexes for a particular gendered
behavior.
Thus, our goal in this article is to draw attention to the four key
principles of overlap, mosaicism, contingency and entanglement
that have emerged from sex/gender research, and discuss how they
should inform NI research design, analysis and interpretation.
PRINCIPLES FROM SEX/GENDER SCHOLARSHIP
OVERLAP
Studies examining sex/gender typically categorize participants as
female or male and apply statistical procedures of comparison.
Sex/gender differences in social behavior and cognitive skills are,
if found, far less profound than those portrayed by common
stereotypes. As Hyde (2005) found in her now classic review of
46 meta-analytic studies of sex differences, scores obtained from
groups of females and males substantially overlap on the majority
of social, cognitive, and personality variables. Of 124 effect
sizes (Cohen, 1988)3 reviewed, 30% were between (+/−) 0 and
0.1 (e.g., negotiator competitiveness, reading comprehension,
vocabulary, interpersonal leadership style, happiness), while
48% were between (+/−) 0.11 and 0.35 (e.g., facial expression
processing in children, justice vs. care orientation in moral
reasoning, arousal to sexual stimuli, spatial visualization,
democratic vs. autocratic leadership styles). There is non-trivial
overlap even on “feminine” and “masculine” characteristics
such as physical aggression (d ranges from 0.33 to 0.84), tender-
mindedness (d =−0.91), and mental rotation (d ranges from 0.56
to 0.73). More recent reviews have also emphasized the extent of
this overlap (Miller and Halpern, 2013; Hyde, 2014).
3By convention, a positive effect size refers to greater average male score, while
a negative effect size refers to a greater average female score.
There are more significant differences between women and
men in other categories of behavior, such as choice of occu-
pations and hobbies (Lippa, 1991). However, regardless of how
one wishes to characterize the data (that is, as demonstrating
that females and males are “different” or “similar”), or the
functional significance of differences of a particular size (con-
siderable or trivial), the important point for NI researchers is
that the distributions of social cognitive variables typically of
interest in research are likely to be highly overlapping between
the sexes, and this has implications for research design. It has
also been argued that many small differences may “add up”
to very significant differences overall (Del Giudice et al., 2012;
Cahill, 2014, although for critique of the latter, see Stewart-
Williams and Thomas, 2013; Hyde, 2014). However, not only
does this argument overlook the “mosaic” structure of sex/gender
(discussed in the next section) but, additionally, NI researchers
will generally be interested in isolating just one or two behavioral
variables.
Overlap in behavioral phenotype does not necessarily imply
overlap in cortical structural and functional phenotype, since
potentially the same behavioral ends may be reached via different
neural means—an important point when it comes to interpreta-
tion of group differences in neural characteristics (Fine, 2010b;
Hoffman, 2012). Indeed, it has been noted in non-human animals
that one average difference between the sexes in a brain char-
acteristic may compensate for another, giving rise to behavioral
similarity (De Vries, 2004). However, it nonetheless appears to be
the case that establishing non-ephemeral sex/gender differences
in cortical structures and functions has proved difficult. One
commonly cited difference, supported by several meta-analyses
and reviews, is that absolute brain volume is greater in men
than in women (Lenroot and Giedd, 2010; Sacher et al., 2013)
even when body size is controlled for (Cosgrove et al., 2007),
although, as with psychological characteristics, the distributions
overlap considerably. The significance of this is that, once volume
differences are controlled for, many previously reported regional
differences in specific structures disappear (e.g., Leonard et al.,
2008). For instance, the claim that callosal size is greater in males
is not supported when there is careful matching between the
sexes in brain-size (Bishop and Wahlsten, 1997; Jäncke et al.,
1997; Luders et al., 2014). However, this may not invariably be
the case, with clusters of regional female/male differences in gray
matter found to persist even in female and male participants
matched for brain size (Luders et al., 2009), consistent with
some previous findings (e.g., Good et al., 2001; Luders et al.,
2006) but not all (Lüders et al., 2002). In addition, Giedd et al.
(2012) note that the non-linear scaling relationship between
brain size and brain proportions affects white to gray matter
ratios, which could account for female/male differences in this
measure.
It is also important to note that it has proved difficult to repli-
cate well-accepted reports of sex/gender differences in functional
organization of brain regions underpinning specific cognitive
skills. A salutary example of this is the long-standing hypothesis
that the male brain is more lateralized for language processing.
A high-impact report that partially supported this hypothesis
(Shaywitz et al., 1995, see Kaiser et al., 2009) was subsequently
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shown to be spurious in two meta-analytic studies (Sommer et al.,
2004, 2008).
The substantive point here is not to argue that there are no
structural or functional brain differences between the sexes, but
to draw attention to the fact that neural characteristics are not so
distinctly different in the sexes that reliable differences are easily
identified. These data make it clear that dimorphism, the existence
of two distinct forms, is not an accurate way to characterize
sex/gender differences in neural phenotype.
MOSAICISM
Developments in understanding of the structure of gender (that
is, the traits, roles, behaviors, attitudes, and so on, associated
with femininity and masculinity) have challenged the earlier
assumption that the sexes cluster distinctively and consistently at
opposite ends of a single gender continuum (Terman and Miles,
1936) or can be located on two discrete “feminine” and “mas-
culine” dimensions (Bem, 1974). Because different feminine and
masculine characteristics are only weakly inter-correlated, if at all,
gender is now understood to be multi-factorial, rather than one-
or two-dimensional (Spence, 1993). Similarly, Carothers and Reis
(Carothers and Reis, 2013; Reis and Carothers, 2014), applying
taxometric methods to analyze the latent structure of gender,
have recently concluded that females’ and males’ psychological
attributes mostly differ in ways that are continuous rather than
categorical.
Similarly in neuroscience, the phenomenon of brain
mosaicism has been recognized for decades (Witelson, 1991;
Cahill, 2006; McCarthy and Arnold, 2011, see also Joel, 2011).
That is, an individual does not have a uniformly “female” or
“male” brain, but the “male” form (as statistically defined) in
some areas and the “female” form in others, and in ways that
differ across individuals. (Nor is this necessarily static, with
animal research indicating that even brief experiences such
as stress exposure can change brain characteristics from the
“female” to the “male” form, and vice versa; see Joel, 2011).4
Thus, having a region in (say) the corpus callosum where a
structural or functional characteristic has been shown to be
statistically more characteristic of females is not a good predictor
for whether the same individual brain will also have a region in
(say) the amygdala that is associated with females. An implication
of this mosaicism is that specific brain areas that are labeled as
having a “female” or “male” phenotype can only be detected
through group-level statistical comparisons. In other words, just
as individuals are not comprehensively feminine or masculine
in traits, roles attitudes, etc., so too is it not possible for an
individual to have a “single-sex” brain.
Mosaicism of gendered behavior and brains is a critically
important point, because it conflicts with the more (although
not absolutely) categorical nature of biological sex, in which
female/male differences in sex chromosomes, gonads and gen-
itals are roughly dimorphic and highly interrelated, such that
4The terms “female” and “male” here do not indicate an “innate” or “natural”
neural maleness or femaleness, but are rather place-holders for a statistical
approach that involves calculating the effect size of sex for a particular brain-
related data set.
individuals mostly have a unitary “male” or “female” phenotype.
As Joel (2012) has put the issue, “Using 3G-sex (genetic-gonadal-
genitals) as a model to understand sex differences in other
domains (e.g., brain, behavior) leads to the erroneous assump-
tion that sex differences in these other domains are also highly
dimorphic and highly consistent” (p. 1). Even where mosaicism
is acknowledged, the evidence may be undermined by common
terminology such as “female or male phenotype” (for describ-
ing global brain structure or psychology) or “sex dimorphism”
(Jordan-Young, 2014).
CONTINGENCY
Gendered behavior arises out of a dauntingly complex, recip-
rocally influencing interaction of multi-level factors, including
structural-level factors (e.g., prevailing cultural gender norms,
policies and inequalities), social-level factors (e.g., social status,
role, social context, interpersonal dynamics) as well as individual-
level factors such as biological characteristics (see “entanglement”
principle in the following section), gender identity, gendered
traits, attitudes, self-concepts, experiences, and skills. A few illus-
trative examples, which depart from the more “intuitive” concep-
tion of sex/gender differences as emerging from a causal pathway
that runs from genes to hormone to brain to behavior to social
structure, may be useful.
At the group level, women’s expression of “masculine” person-
ality traits (such as assertiveness) appears to be responsive to cul-
tural shifts in social status and role (Twenge, 1997, 2001), while in
the shorter term, gendered behavior is flexibly responsive to social
context and experience. For example, a meta-analysis conducted
by Ickes et al. (2000) found that a moderate female advantage
in empathic accuracy was only observed if participants were also
asked to make self-ratings of their accuracy (hypothesized to pref-
erentially enhance women’s motivation to perform well). Another
well-known example of social contextual effects on gendered
behavior is the “stereotype threat” phenomenon whereby, for
instance, female mathematical performance is diminished when
tests are presented in a way that makes salient the stereotype that
females are poor at mathematics (Nguyen and Ryan, 2008; Walton
and Spencer, 2009), although we acknowledge the more sceptical
conclusion regarding the size, robustness, and generality of the
stereotype threat effect from the meta-analysis by Stoet and Geary,
2012. As a third example, the average male advantage in mental
rotation is diminished by altering how the task is framed (e.g.,
Moè, 2009). Moreover, the beneficial effects of training, including
video-gaming, points to the contribution of gendered experience
to this skill (Feng et al., 2007). (For numerous additional examples
of stereotype threat effects on sex/gender differences, see Fine,
2010a).
From this brief discussion it should therefore not be surprising
that, in contrast with the near complete consistency of genetic,
gonadal and genital differences between the sexes, female/male
differences in behavior are variable across time, place, social or
ethnic group, and social situation. Indeed, intersectionality—the
principle that important social identities like gender, ethnicity,
and social class “mutually constitute, reinforce, and naturalize one
another” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 302)—is an important tenet of gen-
der scholarship (Crenshaw, 1991; Shields, 2008). For example, as
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 650 | 3
Rippon et al. Issues in functional neuroimaging sex/gender research
reviewed in Hyde (2014), female/male differences in mathematics
in the USA have not only decreased over time but also vary or
even reverse according to ethnic group. A review of differences
in math achievement in 69 nations by Else-Quest et al. (2010)
revealed that gender differences were not only very small, but
highly variable, with effect sizes ranging from −0.42 (a moderate
difference favoring females) to 0.40 (a moderate difference favor-
ing males); socio-cultural factors such as women’s parliamentary
representation, equity in school enrolment, and women’s share of
research jobs were significant predictors of gender gaps in math
achievement. As with cognitive skills, female/male differences in
personality (e.g., neuroticism/anxiety) or well-being (e.g., self-
esteem) that are seen in one country or ethnic group are not
necessarily observed in others (Costa et al., 2001, reviewed in
Hyde, 2014).
ENTANGLEMENT
As indicated above, there is considerable evidence that average
female/male differences can be modified, neutralized, or even
reversed by specific context, for example the manipulation of the
salience of such differences, or by chronic structural factors in the
environment, such as national wealth or gender equity (reviewed
in Miller and Halpern, 2013; Hyde, 2014). Clearly, this will be
reflected in the neural substrates of such behavior, which therefore
cannot be universal or fixed (see Fine, 2013b). This type of finding
is in keeping with the rejection of early models of the relationship
between brain and behavior in the study of sex/gender. These
were based on a fairly simple, almost unidirectional concept of
“hard-wiring”, in which brain characteristics were conceived as
being predetermined by the organizational effects of genetically-
programmed prenatal hormonal influences (Phoenix et al., 1959).
Here, each individual is endowed with a “female” or “male” brain
that gives rise to feminine and masculine behavior, respectively;
a neural substrate that social factors merely influence. This
assumption of distinctive female vs. male brain circuitry, largely
fixed by a sexually-differentiated genetic blueprint, is now clearly
challenged by changed models of neurodevelopment and wide-
spread consensus of on-going interactive and reciprocal influ-
ences of biology and environment in brain structure and function
(Li, 2003; Lickliter and Honeycutt, 2003; van Anders and Watson,
2006; Hausmann et al., 2009; McCarthy and Arnold, 2011; Miller
and Halpern, 2013). As NI research itself has been instrumental
in demonstrating, such interactions leave neural traces. A recent
review by May (2011) summarizes the evidence that new events,
environmental changes and skill learning can alter brain function
and the underlying neuroanatomic circuitry throughout our lives.
Such changes could be brought about by, for example, normal
learning experiences such as learning a language (Stein et al.,
2012) or specific training activities such as taxi-driving or juggling
(Maguire et al., 2000; Draganski et al., 2004; Chang, 2014). Other
research demonstrates brain characteristics that vary as a
function of socio-economic status (Hackman and Farah, 2009;
Noble et al., 2012) or even subjective or perceived socio-economic
status (Gianaros et al., 2007). Despite the key role played by NI
research in the emergent concept of the permanently plastic brain,
only a few NI studies have demonstrated how neuronal plasticity
has been related to sex/gender. Wraga et al. (2006), using a direct
comparison of task-related positive and negative stereotype prim-
ing, showed that the neural correlates of performance of the same
task reflected this priming, demonstrating short-term plasticity of
neural function. Longer-term functional and structural plasticity
was indicated in another within-sex study investigating the neural
effects in adolescent girls of 3 months of training with the visuo-
spatial problem solving computer game Tetris (Haier et al., 2009).
This dynamic and interactive conception of brain development
means that biological sex and the social phenomenon of gender
are “entangled” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). That is, as a categoriza-
tion linked to social difference and inequality, an individual’s
biological sex systematically affects their psychological, physical,
and material experiences (Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young,
2012; Springer et al., 2012). For example, because gender is
an important organizing principle for social life, giving rise
to intensive gender socialization, including self-socialization
processes (e.g., Bussey and Bandura, 1999; Martin and Ruble,
2004; Leaper and Friedman, 2007; Tobin et al., 2010), both
formal training (e.g., school and vocational instruction) and daily
experiences (e.g., sports involvement, hobbies, games, poverty,
and harassment) are, at the group level, different for females
and males. It will be critical for NI work investigating hormone-
brain relations to take into account important insights into
entanglement from social neuroendocrinology. Contemporary
models identify hormones such as testosterone as key mediators
of behavioral plasticity, with animal research indicating both
genomic and non-genomic mechanisms involving both long-
term structural reorganization and short-term modulation of
sensitivity of neural circuitry (Adkins-Regan, 2005; Oliveira,
2009). This enables animals to be flexibly responsive to social
situations that, in humans, incorporate gendered norms with
respect to social phenomena such as competition, sexuality, and
nurturance (van Anders, 2013). For example, it has been shown
that fatherhood can reduce testosterone levels in males and that
this effect varies with the extent of paternal care and physical
contact with offspring (Gettler et al., 2011). Furthermore, a
comparison of two neighboring cultural groups in Tanzania
found lower testosterone levels among fathers from the popu-
lation in which paternal care was the cultural norm compared
with fathers from the group in which paternal care was typically
absent (Muller et al., 2009). Entanglement thus refers to the fact
that the social phenomenon of gender is literally incorporated,
shaping the brain and endocrine system (Fausto-Sterling, 2000),
becoming “part of our cerebral biology” (Kaiser et al., 2009, p. 57).
KEY PRINCIPLES: SUMMARY
The issues identified above indicate that, for NI researchers wish-
ing to examine sex/gender variables in studies of the human brain,
there are key factors which need to be taken into consideration in
the design, analysis, and interpretation of research in this category.
As illustrated in Figure 1, there will need to be adjustments made
to the assumptions underlying current typical research practices.
As will by now be clear from the discussion of the key principles
of sex/gender scholarship, gender essentialist assumptions are
inappropriate, and the experimental context complex and
contingent. Any one sample will consist of individuals with an
intricate mosaic of gendered attributes, the distributions for many
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FIGURE 1 | Comparison of “Essentialist” vs. “Social Context”
models of experimental design in sex/gender research. (Shaded
section): the essentialist model that is often implicit in NI sex/gender
research: female-male differences appear to be directly traceable to
initial genetic differences between female and male individuals.
(Unshaded section): the social context model where social context
variables interact with individual biologies (contingency) and create
feedback loops with research design and practices (entanglement):
results of particular studies are understood as contingent and
entangled “snapshots”.
of which will be largely overlapping and may not differ at the
group level in that particular sample. Similarly, the individuals
in the sample will not have “female” or “male” brains as such,
but a mosaic of “feminine” and “masculine” characteristics.
Whatever female/male behavioral and therefore brain differences
are observed in that particular sample are contingent on both
chronic and short-term factors such as social group (such as social
class, ethnicity), place, historical period, and social context and
therefore cannot be assumed a priori to be generalizable to other
populations or even situations (such as the same task performed
in a different social context). Each individual’s behavioral and
neural phenotype at the moment of experimentation is the
dynamic product of a complex developmental process involving
reciprocally influential interactions between genes, brain, social
experience, and cultural context. Simpler, implicitly essentialist
models (see lower, shaded portion of Figure 1) will need
to be replaced by more complex multivariate models which
acknowledge the interactive contribution of many additional
sociocultural factors (see upper portion of Figure 1).
So what strategies do these key principles of sex/gender
scholarship imply for NI sex/gender research design, method-
ology, and interpretation? We now outline some of the key
implications and recommendations for research design, data
analysis, and interpretation, which we hope will result in changes
from standard practices (as illustrated in Figure 2A) to greater
acknowledgment of gender similarities as well as differences,
follow-up replication studies, and assessment of effect stabilities
where differences are found (see Figure 2B). We conclude with
a few comments concerning how these issues relate to ongoing
discussions regarding discipline-wide practices.
RECOMMENDATIONS
RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample size
Ultimately, sex/gender social and cognitive neuroscience is con-
cerned with the relationship between behavior and the brain,
and it is therefore critical that researchers be aware that the
key principle of overlap means that participants divided on the
basis of biological sex cannot be assumed to have neatly distinct
behavioral or cortical structural or functional profiles. Where
there is considerable overlap in distribution of scores between a
grouping factor (e.g., sex) and the dependent variable of interest,
the magnitude of any difference, or effect size (Cohen, 1988) will
be very small. Research designed to measure such a difference will
obviously need an adequately large sample size to reliably and
consistently identify such differences. Small sample size and asso-
ciated reduced statistical power has been identified as a central
problem in NI research (Carp, 2012; Button et al., 2013), as well
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison of “typical” vs. “recommended” processes in
NI research. (A) Typical experimental process in NI research on sex/gender
is oriented towards identifying differences. Biological sex is considered
primary; two sexes are routinely compared, and findings of “no difference”
are often lost (though this may also stimulate redesign of study to better
detect difference). (B) The recommended experimental process proceeds
from the principle of overlap; when differences are observed, researchers
attempt to discern the reliability and sensitivity of these observations to
social and experimental context. Reports place equal emphasis on findings
of sex/gender difference and similarity, with emphasis on distributions.
as in sex/gender fMRI studies (Kaiser, 2010; Fine, 2013a). This
clearly raises a concern regarding the high probability of false-
negative findings. However, the low statistical power of many
studies also validates considerable concern that many reported
statistically significant findings are “false positive”. False-positive
errors are arguably the most costly errors in science (Simmons
et al., 2011), and can be remarkably persistent despite docu-
mented null findings (Fidler, 2011; Fine, 2013a). Although, in the-
ory, the probability of false positive errors should remain the same
regardless of sample size, as Fine and Fidler (2014) have noted,
a combination of publication bias, data noise, large intersubject
variability, and considerable scope for researcher discretion about
the construction of dependent variables may mean that, in prac-
tice, this is not the case. The difficulty, to date, of establishing
reliable, non-controversial sex differences in the brain becomes
less surprising in light of the key sex/gender principles discussed
here and indicates that studies with small sample sizes will lack
adequate statistical power and produce unreliable findings.
Independent and dependent variables
The evidence that gendered characteristics are often overlapping
and multi-dimensional indicates the usefulness of a dimensional
trait-based, rather than categorical sex-based, approach to
research (Jordan-Young and Rumiati, 2012). Although in
psychology the experimental registration of sex/gender in a multi-
parametric way is in its infancy, attempts are being made to trace
the many different facets of what is an “enormous conglomeration
of socialized, behavioral, cognitive, and culturally embedded
biomarkers” (Kaiser, 2014). To give some examples, relevant and
multiple information about sex/gender can be assessed through
the utilization of questionnaires assessing gendered personality
dimensions (Personal Attributes Questionnaire, PAQ; Spence
and Helmreich, 1978), gender attitudes (Ambivalent Sexism
Inventory, ASI; Glick and Fiske, 1996), self-attributed gender
norms (Conformity To Masculine Norms Inventory, Mahalik
et al., 2003, Conformity To Feminine Norms Inventory, CMFI;
Mahalik et al., 2005), specific aspects of gender socialization (The
Child Gender Socialization Scale, Blakemore and Hill, 2008),
gender identity (Joel et al., 2013) and others (for reviews, see
Smiler and Epstein, 2010; Moradi and Parent, 2013). A multi-
parametric registration of sex/gender combines multiple binary
classifications in various ways, similar to the mosaic-approach
of Joel (2011). Most importantly, it promises to emphasize the
multi-dimensionality of the factor sex/gender which is usually
only measured by checking the F or M box (see Figure 1). In
this way, specific sex/gender related information about gendered
experiences, gendered socialization, gendered behavior, gendered
cognition could be collected. With the emergent availability of
large neuroimaging (NI) datasets, much more subtle interro-
gation of these data would be possible if the demographic data
collected on the participants reflected the entangled complexity
of their psychological, physical, and material experiences, rather
than just their age and sex, as is currently typically the case.
As discussed above, there are physical characteristics of partic-
ipants that are specifically relevant to sex/gender NI research such
as head size (Barnes et al., 2010), given its relationship to brain
volume. Similarly, height and weight should be noted in order to
carry out the appropriate adjustments to brain volume measures;
failure to do this must undermine the validity of any reports of sex
differences in brain structure, as acknowledged by Ruigrok et al.
(2014). There is the possibility that variations in hormone levels
might produce (or mask) relevant sex/gender differences in brain
structure and function. There is not currently strong evidence
for such effects, but future research should be sure to take into
account a range of sources of variation (e.g., diurnal, seasonal, and
activity-related), and investigate variations in all research partici-
pants, as opposed to a singular focus, for example, on menstrual
cyclicity and variations in women only. If there is a focus on
hormonal variables, it should be noted that menstrual cycle phase
is not, in fact, a good proxy for hormone fluctuations and direct
measures will be required (Schwartz et al., 2012). Researchers
should also be aware that popular beliefs/well-publicized claims
regarding the psychological effects of menstrual phase on mood
and male attractiveness ratings, have not been supported by
recent meta-analyses (Romans et al., 2012; Wood et al., 2014, for
contrary conclusion, see Gildersleeve et al., 2014, for critique, see
Wood and Carden, in press).
If the basis of the research question is a link between
measured differences in brain structure or activation patterns
and behavioral or cognitive profiles, then a study’s dependent
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variables should obviously include appropriate measures of the
relevant behavior or cognitive skill, and not just assume that such
differences are well-known (and therefore do not need measur-
ing) (Tomasi and Volkow, 2012). Whatever behavioral measures
researchers choose in order to investigate the phenomenon of
interest, it will be necessary to acknowledge that no sex/gender
differences are “fixed” but contingent, the implication being that
research findings will at best be a snapshot of the relationship of
interest. Thus, an important research possibility is to addition-
ally draw on the principles of contingency and entanglement to
challenge the stabilities of observed differences and similarities, by
experimenting with context or population, for example. This can
be seen, for example, in studies investigating the extent to which
training can alter pre-existing sex/gender differences in visuo-
spatial processing (Feng et al., 2007). This type of research design
would enable researchers to perform a “sensitivity analysis” of
the conditions under which sex/gender is related to some kind of
neural function or structure, facilitating knowledge of the stability
and contingency of observed group differences. Hyde (2014) has
similarly recommended a focus on the exploration of contexts in
which gender differences appear and disappear as a way forward
in such research.
Research models and hypotheses
Although whole brain analysis is possible with all NI techniques,
many researchers choose to specify Regions of Interest (ROIs),
particular areas of the brain identified as of interest due to
previous research findings or predictions from particular neu-
rocognitive models. This approach can, for example, reduce the
multiple comparison problem resulting from comparing voxels
across the whole brain. Where an ROI approach is chosen for
either structure or function measures, the regions need to be
clearly specified in advance (Poldrack et al., 2008) which may
be difficult in the absence of a well-specified neurocognitive
model (see Bluhm, 2013a). Researchers may instead be drawn
to a priori hypotheses based on gender stereotypes (see Bluhm,
2013b), but clearly it needs to be carefully established whether
such stereotypes are more than trivially true.
Changing models of brain–behavior relationships require
adaptation of research exploring such relationships with atten-
tion to more and/or different categories of independent vari-
ables, including ways of capturing the role of the environment.
McCarthy and Arnold (2011, p. 681) note the need for a “more
nuanced portrayal of the types of variables that cause sex dif-
ferences”, acknowledging that environmental influences “have
an enormous effect on gender in humans and are arguably
more potent in sculpting the gender-based social phenotype of
humans” (p. 682). Jordan-Young (2010) and Jordan-Young and
Rumiati (2012) similarly identify problems associated with the
hard-wiring, “brain organization” theory in brain and brain
development research and note that if researchers wish to bring
understanding of how differences arise, then there is a need to
focus more on the dynamic aspects of brain development, on
the plasticity of the brain, and on identifying those events that
enhance or change the course of development. For example,
Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young (2012) reviewed research on
the epidemiology of autism, focusing on studies that described or
advanced explanations for the observed male preponderance in
autism diagnosis. They found no studies that explored potential
biosocial interactions of sex-linked biology and gender relations.
Instead, the female/male difference was attributed to biological
factors by default, though multiple lines of evidence suggest that
gender could play a role in either the development of the disorder,
or the likelihood of diagnosis once it is developed.
Given the major role played by NI itself in transforming our
understanding of brain plasticity, it is surprising that there are so
few examples of study design, cohort selection, and/or data inter-
pretation where the entanglement of sex and gender is considered.
The predominant approach is a “snapshot” comparison of females
and males, which will only give limited insights regarding why,
when or in whom such differences exist (Schmitz, 2002; Fine,
2013a,b). Importantly, although neuroscientists are well-aware
that “in the brain” does not mean “hardwired”, the predominant
use of “snap-shot” comparisons in sex/gender NI is guaranteed
not to produce data that might challenge the idea of universal,
fixed female/male brain differences (Fine, 2013a). The limitations
of a “snapshot” approach should be acknowledged in the research
design, where the choice of participants and/or their demograph-
ics should reflect more than just their biological sex (and possibly
age) but also perhaps factors such as educational history and
socio-economic and occupational status, with these factors con-
trolled for in any subsequent analyses. Particular attention should
be paid to the fact that there will be missing information concern-
ing gendered socialization of participants. It is very probable that
attitudes and behaviors of an individual have been sex-typically
reinforced by the environment throughout her/his life and that
development has been influenced by the particular importance of
social learning in humans in combination with culturally shared
gender stereotypes, norms, and roles (see Wood and Eagly, 2013).
As identified above, assessment tools for measuring information
about individual gender socialization are rare (Blakemore and
Hill, 2008), no doubt in part because the whole process of gender
socialization is highly complex and long-lasting, but also because
it is mostly implicit and habitual, rather than deliberate. However,
measures of gendered personal traits, attitudes, or cognitive devel-
opment can indirectly reflect the effects of gender socialization.
Fine and Fidler (2014) have argued that the principles of
overlap and mosaicism, together with the complexities arising
from the consequences of contingency and entanglement, raise
the important conceptual question of whether it makes sense at all
to try to identify an effect size of the impact of biological sex on
brain structure or function. But whatever precise research ques-
tion is pursued, uncovering what are undoubtedly highly com-
plex interactions against a background of noise and considerable
individual differences will require more complex experimental
designs. As the complexity of design increases, with multiple
groups and multiple comparisons, so too must the sample size
increase if adequate statistical power is to be achieved.
DATA ANALYSIS
Given the overlapping nature of sex/gender differences, it is
important that effect sizes for each of the individual variables
are reported. When studies reporting sex/gender differences
only provide information about statistical differences, a
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misleading impression can be given of a near distinctive—
or even oppositional—dichotomous finding. This was recently
well illustrated by a large-scale (n = 949) report of significant
sex differences in the structural connectome of the human
brain (Ingalhalikar et al., 2014), accompanied by statements
that the results “establish that male brains are optimized
for intrahemispheric and female brains for interhemispheric
communication” (p. 823). This was suggested to underpin
“pronounced [behavioral] sex differences” (p. 826). However, no
corrections for brain volume were made, and the actual effect
sizes for brain differences were unreported, while behavioral
differences in the larger population from which the sample were
drawn were very modest (Joel and Tarrasch, 2014), being between
0 and 0.33 for behavioral differences, with 11 of 26 effect sizes
being null/d < 0.1 (Gur et al., 2012).
A second statistical issue relating to the presentation of find-
ings is the problematic statistical practice observed in neu-
roscience generally (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011), as well as in
NI sex/gender research (Kaiser et al., 2009; Bluhm, 2013a), of
analyzing group data separately and then doing a “qualitative”
comparison. Thus in sex/gender research, if a difference is found
in one group and not the other, it is reported as a sex difference,
even though no statistically significant difference has been estab-
lished. In some cases, both within-group and direct comparisons
are carried out, but only the former reported on. As Bluhm
(2013a) points out, only by a direct statistical comparison, can a
genuine difference be established, which should be illustrated by a
single image showing the group differences, not 2 separate images
for the 2 groups.
As will by now be clear, sex/gender NI research will require
complex statistical frameworks to integrate the key variables
associated with the participant cohort, to deal with the presence
of potential nuisance variables, as well as incorporating imaging
and behavioral data. This is obviously true of all NI research,
and currently generally addressed by the use of General Linear
Models (GLMs). However, the particularly “entangled” nature
of the demographic, biological, and psychological variables in
sex/gender research and the associated non-parametric nature
of much of the data should be acknowledged if using a stan-
dard GLM analysis (Poline and Brett, 2012)—or, better, non-
parametric methods such as permutation tests could be applied
(Winkler et al., 2014). It is important that, whatever it comprises,
the analysis pipeline is clearly specified (Bennett and Miller, 2010;
Carp, 2012).
INTERPRETATION
The principle of overlap in gendered behavior is particularly
important to bear in mind when it comes to inferring functional
interpretations from neural differences (Fine, 2010b; Roy, 2012).
It would seem obvious to add that this should be particularly
true where there is no actual measure of the behavior/cognitive
skill. The problematic nature of “reverse inference” is, of course,
well-known in the neuroscientific community (e.g., Poldrack,
2006). In reverse inference, activation in particular brain regions
is taken to equate to a specific mental process and, by extension,
differences in activation can be taken to indicate differences in
ability or efficiency. The danger is that gender stereotypes are
inappropriately drawn upon in making such reverse inferences.
This can happen particularly readily when, as is very often the
case, there is no a priori neurocognitive model guiding hypothe-
ses (Bluhm, 2013a; Fine, 2013a). This can lead to “stereotype-
inspired” reverse inferences even where these are contradicted by
behavioral similarity (see Fine, 2013a). In making reverse infer-
ences that are consistent with gender stereotypes, different groups
of researchers may even make precisely opposite assumptions
about the behavioral significance of more vs. less activation in the
same brain region (Bluhm, 2013b).
Although reverse inference is a generic issue in NI research,
the ease and intuitive plausibility of such inferences in sex/gender
NI studies makes it of particular concern. Reverse inference can
certainly be a useful research tool when used to generate hypothe-
ses to put to test in further work (Poldrack, 2008), and Fine
(2013b) has noted the legitimacy of such an approach as part of a
strategy of systematic development and testing of neurocognitive
models and predictions. However, what is more common is to
draw on stereotypical (and often inaccurate) assumptions about
female/male differences in behavior or skill set post hoc to inform
these inferences (Fine, 2013a). Given the sex/gender principle of
overlap, this is poor scientific practice.
A final point of interpretation relates to entanglement. A recent
review of sex/gender differences in decision-making “noted that
we will use sex differences rather than gender differences in this
review as we are focussed on biologically founded rather than
culturally or socio-economically founded differences” (Van de
Bos et al., 2013, p. 96). However, it is the nature of the entangle-
ment problem that the variables of sex and gender are irreducibly
entwined—it is not, in practice, possible to “control” for the
gendered environment and examine only sex. This should be
acknowledged, then, in the interpretation of findings. In addition,
any evidence that the dependent variables being measured may be
subject to alteration by training or focussed intervention should
also be recognized. In addition, researchers should avoid framing
findings of female-male differences as being “biological” or “fun-
damental”. Likewise, it is generally advisable to avoid the language
that some variable is “affected by sex”, because that suggests the
effect of biology apart from the gendered environment. Instead,
the language “affected by sex/gender” or “linked with sex” would
be preferable. It should, indeed, be considered that a study that
approaches sex/gender as subject variable is only an ex-post facto
study and, thus, it cannot demonstrate that sex/gender causes
differences in any behavior (Brannon, 2008).
DISCIPLINE-WIDE IMPLICATIONS
While the aim of the recommendations above is to inform the
planning, interpreting, and quality assessment of sex/gender
research, we also think it is worth relating these issues to ongoing
discussions regarding collective, discipline-wide strategies that
could be helpful for ameliorating some of the issues in NI
sex/gender research. One interesting proposal to consider is
that of the “pre-registration” of protocols. This “in principle
acceptance” (IPA) has recently been suggested in psychology
circles (Chambers, 2013). A study protocol is submitted for
peer review before the study is carried out; details include the
relevant background literature and hypotheses, together with the
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specific procedures and analysis protocol (including sample size
and a priori power analysis). Once accepted, the study is carried
out exactly according to the agreed procedures and all findings
published. This process could overcome many of those factors
we have identified in this paper as significantly detrimental to
NI sex/gender research. Publication bias could be reduced, as
manuscript acceptance would be a function of the significance of
the research question and associated methodology, not whether
or not the results exceeded the magical p < 0.05 threshold. Thus,
over time, it would be possible to better ascertain the ratio of
negative to positive findings in any research sphere. While we
acknowledge the value and role of exploratory research in the
scientific research, declaring the analysis pipeline in advance
would put constraints on practices such as post hoc data mining
(Wagenmakers et al., 2011) and ensure that any failures to
support hypotheses were identified as well as the converse. It
could also preclude the post hoc introduction of interpretations,
e.g., stereotypical assumptions about participant characteristics
that were not measured as part of the study.
A long-standing proposal also relevant to some of the issues
discussed here (see Fine and Fidler, 2014) is that of following
the discipline of medicine in shifting away from null hypothesis
significance testing towards an estimation approach of effect sizes
and measures of their associated uncertainty, and greater use
of meta-analysis. Proponents of the estimation approach (for
extensive reviews, see Kline, 2004; Cumming, 2012), argue for a
number of advantages over a null hypothesis significance testing
approach, including reduced scope for false positive and false neg-
ative errors, and diminished conflation of statistical significance
with practical or theoretical significance.
While the case for these two proposals is being made for
behavioral science as a whole, the next two suggestions are more
specific to sex/gender research, and arise out of the ease of default
testing for sex/gender differences post hoc. One consequence of
this is that the domain-general publication bias towards positive
findings in behavioral science (Simmons et al., 2011; Fanelli, 2012;
Yong, 2012) is greatly exacerbated in sex/gender research (e.g.,
Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974). Reviews of sex/gender NI research
have demonstrated that this is a field that is indeed vulnerable
to an overemphasis on positive findings and “loss” of null results
(Bishop and Wahlsten, 1997; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Kaiser et al.,
2007; Fine, 2013a; see Figure 2). The first proposal is for the
institutionalization of sex/gender similarity as well as difference
in databases, to make it more likely that null findings are both
recorded and identifiable. The second proposal is for editors of
NI journals to request that sex/gender differences are replicated
in an independent sample (obviously with discretion, depending
on the rigor of the initial findings), to reduce the littering of the
scientific literature with false-positive results.
Although, de facto, all research areas will wish to follow best
practice guidelines, it is particularly important that the sex/gender
NI research community is aware of the potential social signifi-
cance of their findings (Roy, 2012; Schmitz, 2012). As reviewed
elsewhere (e.g., Fine, 2012; Fine and Fidler, 2014), Choudhury
et al. have argued that the representation of “brain facts” in
the media, policy, and lay perceptions influence society in ways
that can affect the very mental phenomena under investigation
(Choudhury et al., 2009). This is illustrated in the upper part
of Figure 1, whereby the result of the experiment itself, through
its popularization, becomes part of gender socialization, and
thus the experiment becomes entangled with the phenomenon
of interest. With respect to NI research, this feedback effect may
be enhanced by the popular and powerful impact of “brain
facts” (Weisberg et al., 2008). The original finding of persua-
sive power of brain images (McCabe and Castel, 2008) has
been disputed both qualitatively (Farah and Hook, 2013) and
quantitatively in a recent meta-analysis (Michael et al., 2013).
However, “brain facts”, regardless of the presence or absence
of brain images, may enhance how satisfactory or valuable lay
people judge scientific explanations of psychological phenom-
ena to be (Morton et al., 2006; Weisberg et al., 2008; Michael
et al., 2013). Gender essentialist thinking has been associated
with a range of negative psychological consequences, including
greater endorsement of gender stereotypes both in relation to
self (Coleman and Hong, 2008) and others (Martin and Parker,
1995; Brescoll and LaFrance, 2004), stereotype threat effects
(Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2006; Thoman et al., 2008), greater
acceptance of sexism, and increased tolerance for the status quo
(Morton et al., 2009). This is in line with what Hacking (1995, p.
351) has described as “looping” or “feedback effects in cognition
and culture”, whereby the causal understanding of a particular
group changes the very character of the group, leading to further
change in causal understanding. In other words, the outputs of
sex/gender NI can affect the very object of their investigation,
putting a particular responsibility on scientists to follow good
practice guidelines for research. By taking steps to avoid false
positives, to avoid the use of stereotypical reverse inferences,
to give equal weight to sex/gender similarities as well as differ-
ences and to acknowledge the dynamic and entangled aspect of
sex/gender variables, with research findings only representing a
static “snapshot” in time, scientists can do much to avoid the
undesirable consequences outlined above (see also Fine et al.,
2013).
CONCLUSION
We have outlined above the consequences for NI sex/gender
research design, analytical protocols, and data interpretation of
the four key principles of overlap, mosaicism, contingency, and
entanglement and have summarized the consequences of these
as a set of guidelines. These key principles and recommendations
could also inform editorial boards and journal reviewers, as well
as those who view, communicate, and interpret such research.
In Figure 3, we offer a set of guidelines for the assessment of
NI sex/gender research in order to assure that such research
has addressed these implications (or, indeed, can). NI research
is costly, time-consuming, and labor intensive. If it is to be
applied in the field of sex/gender research then attention to
the issues discussed here could reduce the incidence of under-
informed research designs with consequent lack of reliable find-
ings and/or waste of potentially valuable datasets. Changes to
current research practices should result in a greater contribution
to an understanding of the interaction between the neurobiology
of the individual and the environment in which s/he develops and
functions.
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FIGURE 3 | Proposed guidelines for sex/gender research in
neuroscience: critical questions for research design, analysis, and
interpretation.
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